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Wn.Ls-STATUTE R.EQuIRING Wn.Ls To BE SIGNED AT nm END THEREOF-

CoMPLIANCE-Testator had properly executed his will in
all respects except that following his and witnesses' signatures there appeared a
clause appointing executors.1 New York statute law2 provided that to be valid a
will must be signed at the end by the testator. Surrogate Court had denied probate. On appeal, held, affirmed. The statute was not complied with, for the end
of a will is not found until the last word of all the provisions is reached. In re
Winter's Will, 98 N.Y.S. (2d) 312 (1950).
Under the common law3 the problems arising when testator has failed to
sign his will are (1) whether testator's signature in the body of the will was
intended by him to be his subscribing signature;4 (2) whether the instrument
was intended by testator to be a preliminary draft or a final and complete
will. 5 Seemingly, the New York statute in the principal case was designed
to eliminate these problems,6 although the reason generally given by New York
courts is that it was designed to avoid fraudulent additions to wills.7 Upon a
literal reading, the statute seems to "be unnecessarily harsh. Judicial decision
in the guise of "interpretation" might have been expected to modify its severity.
FACTS CoNSTITUTING

1 IE this clause had been added after the due execution of the instrument, it would not
affect the validity of what preceded the signature, for it would be in the nature of an ineffective codicil. In re Serveira's Will, 205 App. Div. 686, 200 N.Y.S. 464 (1923); Smith v.
FJlis, 15 Ohio App. 38 (1921); Ward v. Putman, 119 Ky. 889, 85 S.W. 179 (1905); 1
PAGE, WILI.s, 3d ed., §294 (1941).
2 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1949) §21.
a Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677). This is the origin of the requirement that
a will be in writing and that testator and witnesses sign it.
4 Cf. Stone v. Holden, 221 Mich. 430, 191 N.W. 238 (1922), with Bamberger v. Barbour, 335 Ill. 458, 167 N. E. 122 (1929).
15 Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381 (1884), indicates that the legislature intended to remove
such an evil.
6 Adopting this view, see Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N.Y. 140 (1850).
7 In re Gibson's Will, 128 App. Div. 769, 113 N.Y.S. 266 (1908); In re Conway,
124 N.Y. 455, 26 N.E. 1028 (1891).
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But in the leading definitive case8 it was held on facts substantially the same
as the principal case that the whole will was invalid. The reasons for the decision as given by the court are (I) the literal requirements of the statute are
not met;9 (2) provision for an executor is a material part of the will and testator
would presumably prefer to have the whole will invalidated than to have it
stand with a material provision omitted.10 The cases have since tended in
two directions. One line suggests that technical rules of execution should not
stand in the way of substantial justice.11 These cases usually involve an immaterial provision following testator's signature. The reason given for not
demanding that the statute's requirements be fulfilled is either that testator
would prefer to have the part preceding his signature stand alone than have
the whole will fall, 12 or that these provisions should be treated as not a part
of the will because they add nothing to the effect of it.13 The other line of
decisions demands that the strict statutory requisites be fulfilled. 14 Concerning
the authority in respect to provision-for-executor cases, a glance at other jurisdictions indicates that although a respectable number have this requirement15-that
testator sign at , the end of his will-few have any decisions on the subject.
Kentucky16 and Califomia17 have held that the provision for executor following
testator's signature will not invalidate the whole instrument, while Pennsylvania18 has agreed with New York. Ohio courts, which have not decided on
the precise question, have stated that immaterial provisions following testator's
signature will not invalidate the entire will.19 It is submitted that on pure logic
s Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul v. Kelly, 67 N.Y. 409 (1876).
9 Id. at 415, ''To say that where the name is, there is the end of the will, is not to
observe the statute. That requires that where the end of the will is, there shall be the
name."

10 Id. at 416, "It is evident that deceased considered the instrument to be one paper.
We have no reason to say that he wished one part of it to be carried into effect if the whole
was not."
11 In re Gibson's Will, supra note 7; In re Serveira's Will, supra note l; In re Field,
204 N.Y. 448, 97 N.E. 881 (1912).
12 In re Gibson's Will, supra note 7.
13 In re Serveira's Will, supra note 1.
14 As illustrative: the principal case; Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul v. Kelly,
supra note 8; In re Andrew's Will, 43 App. Div. 394, 162 N.Y. 1 (1899).
1 5 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §60-403; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1949) §50; Fla. Stat.
Ann. (1944) §731.07; Idaho Code (1948) §14.303; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) §22.202;
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §§394.040, 446.060; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-107; N.Y.
Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1949) §21; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §56-0302; Ohio
Gen. Code (Page, 1938) §10504-3; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §55; Pa. Decedent's and
Trust Estates (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §191; S.D. Code (1939) §56.0210; Utah Code Ann.
(1943) §101-1-5.
16 Ward v. Putman, supra note 1.
1 7 McCullough's Estate, Myrick Probate Court Reports 76 (1875).
18 In re Wineland's Appeal, 118 Pa. 37, 12 A. 301 (1888). The result was changed
by statute in 1917 which provided that only the provision following testator's signature is
invalid. Pa. Decedent's and Trust Estates (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §191.
10 Baker v. Baker, 51 Ohio St. 217, 37 N.E. 125 (1894); In re MacNealy's Will, 29
Ohio Op. 48, 14 Ohio Supp. 28 (1944). The other four jurisdictions enumerated agree that
this is the general rule, but differ over application.
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any exception to the statutory requirement is unjustified. The statute is clear
and unambiguous. It requires that the testator's signature appear at the end of the
will. Any writing following his signature that was intended by him to be a part
of his will would constitute an invalidation of the entire will. A finding of immateriality or that testator would prefer to void that part than have the whole
will fail appears to be of no significance as far as the statute is concemed.20
The results in the cases, then, can only be explained as an evasion of the statutory
requirements whenever avoidance of the entire will would be unconscionable,
as when substantial justice is defeated by technical rules. That such an exception
is justified seems indisputable, considering the possible evils to be cured by the
statute in relation to the unfortunate result of having many wills refused probate
solely on technical grounds. Especially is this so when the technicality is an immaterial provision that adds nothing to the effect of the will. It is surprising that
the court in the present case refused to adopt this equitable exception. Although
a provision for executor is material in that it adds something to the will, it does
not dispose of property. In the usual case it has no more bearing on testator's
testamentary plan of distribution than does an immaterial provision and it is
submitted that for such provision to invalidate the entire will is just as unconscionable.
Roger D. Anderson
20 In

re O'Neil's Will, 91 N.Y. 516 (1883); 21

CoRN.

L. Q. 351 (1936).

